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Abstract—Almost without exception, cyber-physical systems
operate alongside, for the benefit of, and supported by hu-
mans. Unsurprisingly, disregarding their social aspects during
development and operation renders these systems ineffective. In
this paper, we explore approaches to modelling and reasoning
about the human involvement in socio-cyber-physical systems
(SCPS). To provide an unbiased perspective, we describe both
the opportunities afforded by the presence of human agents, and
the challenges associated with ensuring that their modelling is
sufficiently accurate to support decision making during SCPS
development and, if applicable, at run-time. Using SCPS ex-
amples from emergency management and assisted living, we
illustrate how recent advances in stochastic modelling, analysis
and synthesis can be used to exploit human observations about
the impact of natural and man-made disasters, and to support
the efficient provision of assistive care.
I. INTRODUCTION
The cyber-physical systems used in smart cities, intelligent
transportation, smart healthcare and other new application
domains revolve around humans. As such, the development of
these socio-cyber-physical systems (SCPS) must take human
factors into account. Typically, this requires the modelling
of the human involvement in the SCPS, to enable engineers
to reason about the human and social aspects of the system
under development. Our paper summarises key characteristics
of human involvement in SCPS (Section II), describes existing
and emerging paradigms for the modelling of this involvement
(Section III), and discusses open challenges and opportunities
for exploiting recent research to help address these challenges
(Section IV).
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF HUMAN INVOLVEMENT IN SCPS
More often than not, the modelling of human involvement
in SCPS needs to consider the key characteristics from Fig. 1.
First and foremost, it must consider the role(s) that humans
will play in the SCPS under development. Three broadly
defined (and non-exclusive) roles are typically possible.
First, humans may be input providers for SCPS. In this role,
humans may provide information through standard computer-
based interfaces (in which case the input will be machine read-
able). Alternatively, the information can be provided, directly
or indirectly, through sensors that SCPS use to observe the hu-
mans it interacts with. This information is provided in a format
that is typically straightforward to interpret and understand by
other humans. Examples of human-interpretable input include
voice commands or hand gestures aimed at the SCPS sensors
(for directly-conveyed information), and involuntary signs of
tiredness or distress (for indirectly-conveyed information).
Different levels of uncertainty are associated with these types
of input. Machine-readable input is likely to reflect the true
intention of the humans providing it, within the confines of
a typically predefined input format, and subject to humans
not having mistyped the input, pressed the wrong button,
etc. Direct human-interpretable input may more likely be
“misunderstood” by SCPS, and indirect human-interpretable
input is often associated with the highest level of uncertainty.
A second role for humans involved in SCPS is that of
contributors to the functionality provided by the system.
Two main categories of such contributions are information
processing, where humans contribute to SCPS processes such
as understanding (e.g., of data acquired by SCPS sensors),
decision making and decision validation, and actuation, where
they interact with the environment as required by the SCPS.
A third SCPS role for humans is that of consumer of the
service(s) provided by the system. SCPS services such as the
provision of lighting, air conditioning, heating and music to
a smart building are passively delivered. These services do
not require the SCPS to “gain the attention” of the service
consumer. In contrast, services such as offering a glass of
water to a patient being attended by a healthcare robot requires
a physical interaction between the SCPS and the patient.
Another key characteristic that SCPS modelling should
consider is the responsibility (level) of the humans involved
in the system. Humans hired (or who formally volunteered)
to support the operation of the SCPS—e.g., as information
providers or system contributors—have typically signed a
contract or agreement that makes them accountable for this
support. Conversely, humans involved in the SCPS temporarily
and/or anonymously are typically unaccountable for their
interactions with the system. More than these two levels of
responsibility may be appropriate for some SCPS.
SCPS modelling should also take into account the expertise
(level) of the humans involved in the system. Expert humans
may have received training for the role(s) they play within
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Fig. 1. Key characteristics of human involvement in SCPS
the SCPS, whereas non-experts have not, and therefore their
interactions with the SCPS are likely to be characterised by
significant uncertainty. As before, the modelling of certain
SCPS is likely to be required more than two levels of expertise
to be considered.
The last characteristic shown in Fig. 1 refers to the inten-
tionality of the humans involved in SCPS. SCPS modelling
should typically consider the presence of both cooperative
and adversarial humans that interact with the system. A
finer-grained characterisation of human intentionality might be
required for some SCPS, e.g., by also considering a class of
“neutral” humans involved in the SCPS under development.
Example 1 We illustrate the characteristics described in this
section using an SCPS adapted from our recent work in [1].
This SCPS is a route-planning system for the emergency
evacuation of areas affected by natural disasters such as
earthquakes. The system continually re-plans the evacuation
routes based on the most recent information about aftershocks,
the state of the road infrastructure, the availability of water,
food, medicine and fuel in different parts of the evacuated
areas, etc. The SCPS obtains this information not only from
sensors (used, for instance, to monitor the road infrastruc-
ture), but also from people in the area, who provide human-
interpretable input as plain-text messages published on social
media. Furthermore, the system relies on qualified personnel
(and, in the future, on mobile robots) to help the evacuees
who are in particularly critical situations, and to repair or
replace failed SCPS components. The recommended routes
are passively delivered to all other evacuees.
In this example, evacuees are service consumers (both of a
passively-delivered service and of services requiring physical
interaction). Additionally, some of them are input providers (of
human-interpretable input). They are typically unaccountable,
non-expert and cooperative SCPS participants. In contrast, the
qualified personnel (comprising, for instance, first responders)
are accountable, expert and cooperative system contributors.
III. MODELLING HUMAN INVOLVEMENT IN SCPS
The characteristics from Section II determine a broad range
of interrelated human attributes that typically need to be ex-
plicitly captured by SCPS modelling. These attributes include:
• Reliability—Accountable, expert humans’ involvement in
SCPS is more reliable than that of unaccountable and/or
non-expert humans.
• Response time, throughput, latency—These attributes are
likely to vary greatly across SCPS tasks, across the
people who perform these tasks, and even across different
executions of the same task by the same person. Just how
significant this variation is depends on all the character-
istics from the previous section.
• Robustness—Expert humans may cope with change (e.g.,
in the information that needs processing) better than the
“cyber” components of SCPS; they may even be able
to handle “unknown unknowns”. In contrast, non-experts
may be completely unprepared for change, e.g., non-
expert consumers may be unable to accommodate even
small variations in how the SCPS provide their services.
• Trustworthiness, reputation—Cooperative, expert and ac-
countable humans can normally be trusted to provide
accurate input, to perform SCPS tasks as required, etc.
Conversely, adversarial experts can inflict significant
damage on the services provided by SCPS. Quantifying
trustworthiness, often based on the reputation of the
humans involved in SCPS, is very challenging.
• Predictability, consistency—Human involvement in SCPS
is often associated with low levels of predictability and
lack of consistency. These attributes are likely to be
far better for those who are experts and/or accountable,
although even these SCPS participants tire, can be tem-
porarily distracted, etc.
• Opportunity, willingness, capability (OWC)—A mod-
elling paradigm based on these high-level attributes is
proposed in [2]. This OWC paradigm reduces the di-
mensionality of the attribute space by combining several
finer-grain attributes into a single attribute (e.g., capability
can subsume reliability, response time, latency, etc.).
However, as we show in [3], [4], the components of the
high-level OWC attributes often need to be disambiguated
to enable modelling at the right level of detail.
All these attributes associated with the involvement of hu-
mans in SCPS are affected by uncertainty. As such, expressing
them in the modelling of SCPS requires the quantification
of this uncertainty with its probabilistic, time-related and
potentially adversarial aspects (where possible) or capturing
the nondeterminism induced by the presence of uncertainty
(otherwise). This need calls for the use of formal models
capable of such as queueing networks [5], Petri nets [6],
stochastic models [7] and timed automata [8], [9], and of tools
for their simulation (e.g. Palladio [10]) and verification (e.g.
PRISM [11] and UPPAAL [8]).
Example 2 In recent work, we used Markov decision pro-
cesses (MDPs) to model an assisted-living SCPS developed to
help dementia sufferers with the daily task of hand-washing
[12]. The SCPS provided voice prompts to the sufferers in
certain MDP states, to guide them through what they must do
next, if they were struggling to progress. These voice prompts
became increasingly detailed when the sufferers repeatedly
failed to progress, with human caregivers summoned when the
prompts alone were insufficient. The SCPS aimed to achieve
effective trade-offs between not overloading the sufferers with
overly frequent prompts and not overloading the caregivers by
summoning them too often. The MDP modelled the uncer-
tainties associated with the sufferers’ progress with the hand-
washing task, and with what constituted a suitable pattern
of prompts from the SCPS. This enabled the synthesis of
Pareto-optimal MDP policies corresponding to effective SCPS
configurations.
IV. OPEN CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
New opportunities for SCPS are firstly created by techno-
logical advances. Increasingly reliable and affordable com-
ponents ranging from simple sensors to mobile robots with
sophisticated functionality have greatly increased the range
of potential applications for SCPS, as has the emergence of
5G and energy harvesting technologies. However, architecting
these SCPS and engineering their control software so they can
fully exploit such components is very difficult, in particular for
SCPS used in safety-critical applications and/or which must
adapt to changes in their environment or requirements. This
section describes several of the main open challenges (OCs)
from this area. For each challenge, we discuss recent research
results that may provide opportunities for addressing it.
OC1) Formally specifying the requirements of SCPS—To
reason about the ability of SCPS to meet their requirements,
these requirements need to be expressed formally. Recently
introduced formalisms for the specification and analysis of
collective adaptive systems (e.g., [13]) and for capturing both
the architectural and behavioural characteristics of software
systems (e.g., [14], [15]) could help with addressing this
challenge, although further work is needed to extend them
with the ability to capture the social aspects of SCPS.
OC2) Ensuring the accuracy of stochastic models of SCPS—
When stochastic analysis and verification are applied to inac-
curate models, their results can be significantly skewed. This
can subsequently lead to invalid engineering decisions, which
may be confidently taken due to the false sense of confidence
induced by the use of these formal techniques. Examples of
common practices that may lead to this pitfall include: using
single-point estimates for state transition probabilities; assum-
ing exponentially distributed state transition rates; computing
estimates based on too few observations of the modelled SCPS
(components); and disregarding the fact that model parameters
change over time. In other application domains, such problems
have been mitigated by using online observations to update
these model parameters [16], [17], [18], or using data from
the testing of the system components to compute confidence
intervals for the attributes of interest [19], [20] or to refine
the stochastic models being analysed and verified [21], [22].
We envisage that extensions of these techniques could also
improve the accuracy of SCPS stochastic models.
OC3) Leveraging human-interpretable input—Exploiting this
type of input from humans involved in future SCPS is essential
for the delivery of many of their envisioned services, but is
also very challenging. Recent advances in machine learning,
and in particular in deep learning [23], are expected to support
this important SCPS task, but further research is needed on
how to collect the right data sets, on how to train and verify
trustworthy machine-learned models using these data sets, and
on how to integrate the models into SCPS effectively.
OC4) Synthesis of SCPS—Typically, SCPS development re-
quires the exploration of huge design spaces populated with
alternative SCPS architectures and configurations, many of
which are unfeasible or highly suboptimal. Techniques and
tools are greatly needed to automate this process or parts
of it. Ideally, these techniques and tools would start from
a set of SCPS requirements, and would present developers
with alternative systems designs that satisfy the requirements
and are Pareto-optimal with respect to multiple optimisation
criteria such as cost, utility and environmental impact. Such
solutions have been proposed recently for the development
of software systems (e.g., [24], [25]), and can also handle
uncertainty in the operational profile of the system under
development [26], [27]. However, these solutions cannot yet
handle some of the new types of requirements encountered in
SCPS.
OC5) SCPS self-adaptation—While it makes a lot of sense
for SCPS to adapt their configurations (and even their ar-
chitectures) dynamically to changes in their environment or
requirements [28], [29], building self-adaptation capabilities
within SCPS is extremely challenging due to the multiple
concerns that these systems need to consider. It has taken
the research community the best of two decades to explore
and advance self-adaptive software systems, and, while this
research is relevant to SCPS [30], it needs to be considerably
extended before it can address the non-“cyber” aspects of these
systems.
OC6) SCPS assurance—SCPS assurance requires the provi-
sion of comprehensive evidence and of an (assurance) argu-
ment explaining why safety-critical SCPS can be trusted to
deliver their intended services in their specific environments.
All steps of the SCPS assurance process are highly chal-
lenging: obtaining compelling evidence that all SCPS compo-
nents (including humans and machine-learned models) can be
trusted to their assumed levels of trustworthiness; combining
this evidence to support the assembly of assurance arguments;
and updating the evidence and the assurance argument as
the SCPS evolves through offline maintenance or online self-
adaptation. As for several of the previous open challenges,
previous research on assurance [31], [32] (including assurance
of self-adaptive software systems [33], [34]) may provide
useful starting points for the assurance of SCPS.
Example 3 Consider again the route-planning and assisted-
living SCPS from Examples 1 and 2. While probabilistic
temporal logics were successfully used to specify require-
ments associated with the risks and duration of evacuation
routes [1] and with the sequence of voice prompts provided
to dementia sufferers [12], these logics cannot easily express
requirements such as the interactions between evacuees who
use the same route, or the distress experienced by sufferers
who receive too many reminders or do not see their carers
for long periods of time (open challenge OC1). Furthermore,
the effectiveness of these SCPS depends on the accuracy
with which events (e.g., damage to the road infrastructure)
in the evacuated area and sufferer response to voice prompts,
respectively, are mapped to state transition probabilities within
the stochastic models that underpin decision making in these
systems (OC2). Also essential for the two SCPS is that the
relevant events and changes in the sufferer state are correctly
detected and interpreted (OC3), and that updated evacuation
routes and sequences of voice prompts are efficiently syn-
thesised in line with requirements (OC4). In doing so, both
SCPS may need to dynamically adapt their architecture and
behaviour, e.g., by changing the deployment of the qualified
personnel who collect information about the uncertain parts
of the evacuated area, and by changing the style of the
voice prompts to cope with the carer becoming temporarily
unavailable, respectively (OC5). Last but not least, the two
SCPS are safety critical, and therefore assurances are required
to confirm not only the suitability of their synthesised policies
(which correspond to evacuation routes and sequences of voice
prompts, respectively), but also the robustness of the sensors
collecting data for updating the models used for the policy
synthesis, the correctness of the software used to implement
these policies, etc. (OC6).
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